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T
he link between financial development and
economic growth is not a recent discovery.
And though Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter
(1911), and Gurley and Shaw (1955) motivated this
relationship decades, and indeed, over a century
ago, it remained for economic historians such as
Davis (1965), Cameron (1967), and Sylla (1969),
among others, to give empirical content to the idea.
These scholars primarily used the historical experi-
ences of England and the United States to illustrate
the role of the financial system in paving the way
to market leadership. Since then, macro and devel-
opment economists have studied the link more
formally with theoretical models in which countries
achieve rapid growth through well-developed finan-
cial systems that reduce credit market frictions
(e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990, Greenwood
and Smith, 1997, and Rousseau, 1998) and with
cross-country and time-series statistical studies
that uncover significant effects of financial sector
size on macroeconomic outcomes (e.g., King and
Levine, 1993, and Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998).1
Interestingly, economic historians and macro-
economists studying finance and growth seem for
the most part content to continue pursuing their
closely related agendas independently. Perhaps this
is because macroeconomists usually ask whether
financial factors do indeed matter for growth, while
most economic historians see the answer to this
question as more obvious and ask instead how and
how much they matter. The economic historian’s
prior is understandable—older single-country studies
have made strong cases for finance-led growth with
the sporadic data observations that are usually avail-
able. For the macroeconomist, however, the lack of
an explicit role for financial factors in the baseline
neoclassical growth model combines with a recog-
nition of the statistical and conceptual problems of
establishing causation in cross-country and time-
series regressions to yield a more cautious perspec-
tive. This article attempts to narrow the gap between
these views by illustrating with standard macro-
econometric techniques that the historical time
series that are available for Amsterdam (1640-1794),
England (1720-1850), the United States (1790-1850),
and Meiji Japan (1880-1913) are consistent with
the “finance-led” growth hypothesis. 
The approach is decidedly macroeconomic.
This is because I believe that the empirical growth
literature has underemphasized a key mechanism
through which finance matters in the early stages
of economic development—resource mobilization.
This is not to say that banks and financial markets
do not also promote growth by directing resources
to productive uses, but that their ability to overcome
project indivisibilities and to encourage investors
to accept longer time horizons for payoffs widens
the first bottleneck through which a young economy
must pass. This turns out to be important for the
four countries that I consider in this study, and
especially for the Dutch Republic, England, and the
United States, whose financial sectors emerged
during their “pre-industrial” epochs. Is it no coinci-
dence that England, with the key components of a
financial system in place by 1750, was poised to
tackle industrialization next? The main findings sug-
gest that banks and financial markets did indeed
promote investment and commercial activities by
generating information, pooling funds, facilitating
payments, and providing working capital for the
largest companies that traded on the world’s earliest
“stock exchanges,” at least in the modern sense of
the term.
The article proceeds on a case-by-case basis, but
will, to the degree that it is practical, offer a consistent
empirical framework throughout. At the end, I sum-
marize some of my recent findings with Richard Sylla
for a larger group of countries after 1850. It seems
only appropriate to begin the analysis with the city
of Amsterdam, the site where the action begins.  
1 The empirical literature on the so-called “finance-growth nexus” has
expanded rapidly in recent years, making an exhaustive list of refer-
ences impractical to provide here. Levine (1997) offers a useful survey.
Peter L. Rousseau is an associate professor of economics at Vanderbilt
University and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic
Research. The author thanks Hendrik Houthakker, Larry Neal, Richard
Sylla, Paul Wachtel, Eugene White, and conference participants for
useful comments and suggestions.
© 2003, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.AMSTERDAM
The World’s First Financial Revolution?
Amsterdam rose to prominence as a commercial
city in the late 16th century. Its strategic position in
the North Sea for intra-European and Baltic trade
made it a logical heir to the inheritance of Antwerp,
which had been the center of European commerce
over the preceding century (van der Wee, 1963). As
the largest city in the newly formed United Provinces,
Amsterdam’s reputation for ethnic tolerance also
drew immigrants and their capital from the rest of
Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. These factors
combined by the early 17th century to produce a
bustling commercial community. As the potential
for speculation and profit in trading with the East
Indies became clear, Amsterdam merchants began
pooling resources to equip individual voyages, with
the profits distributed upon sale of the incoming
cargoes. These arrangements were formalized in
1602 with the chartering of the United East India
Company (or VOC, short for Vereenigde Oostindische
Compagnie). The charter called for a combine from
six cities, or chambers, of which Amsterdam was by
far the largest and most important. The VOC was
capitalized with 2,167 shares at a par value of
3,000 florins each, and the owners could liquidate
their stakes through the VOC once every ten years
(Glamann, 1958, pp. 7-8). But when the Directors
repudiated this provision at the end of the first
decade, those wishing to liquidate needed a sec-
ondary market. It was in this climate that shares and
futures began to trade on the Amsterdam bourse—
the world’s first modern securities market if we are
to believe the engaging anecdotes of Josef de la Vega
(1688).
The VOC was Amsterdam’s largest trading com-
pany and held a monopoly by statute and in practice
on Asiatic trade east of the Cape of Good Hope, but
other forms of commerce, especially intra-European,
also flourished in Amsterdam throughout the 17th
century. It was decided early on that the city would
need a clearinghouse for exchange, and the Bank
of Amsterdam (BA) got started in 1609 to perform
this function. And though the innovations of a
clearing bank and exchange bills did not originate
in Amsterdam, having existed previously in Venice
and Antwerp, never before had either form been
used so successfully. 
The BA was not a bank of issue, but instead
accepted bullion and coin from merchants and held
them for safekeeping, issuing receipts for “drawing
accounts” that could be used for exchanging wealth
as needed in the course of trade. The BA also made
large loans to the VOC and to the government over
the next two centuries (to the latter for waging wars).
According to de la Vega (1957, pp. 23-24), however,
the BA did not only support commodity trades, but
was also used to effect payments. For example,
stocks traded on the bourse were often said to be
“payable at the Bank,” and “time accounts” organized
by the BA were used as quasi-official records of
futures agreements—records in which sellers could
attest that they actually held the security that they
had agreed to deliver and in which borrowers could
record their intention to borrow when the time
came to settle or purchase.2 It was in this manner
that the BA and its drawing accounts became a key
component of the stock exchange.
Data and Methodology
To explore quantitatively the relationship
between finance and growth in pre-industrial
Amsterdam, some measures of commercial invest-
ment and of financial size and efficiency are needed.
And though there are few continuous time series
from the period, there are enough to conduct a
preliminary statistical investigation. For example,
van Dillen (1934, pp. 117-23) published annual fig-
ures for the BA’s activities from 1610 through 1820,
including the balances in its “drawing” accounts and
loans to the VOC. To the extent that the BA supported
the stock market and commerce in Amsterdam
during this period, the size of its drawing accounts
may be a reasonable measure of the city’s financial
development. Further, Neal (1990) has improved
upon van Dillen’s (1931) share price series for the
VOC from 1723 through 1794.3 I will use these data
to explore the efficiency of the Amsterdam market
and the importance of any financing constraints
that the VOC might have faced. Measures of aggre-
gate investment in the city are not generally avail-
able, but the VOC archives do include the number
of voyages that the company sent to the East Indies
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2 See also Hermann Kellenbenz’s introduction to the English translation
of de la Vega (1957, p. 18).
3 To build the annual series, I use the final price observation for year
VOC share from Neal’s reading of the Amsterdam Courant. These
observations are usually from the last week in December. I use the
final price observations from van Dillen (1931) for years that are
unavailable in Neal’s data. The VOC prices and other stock market
data from Neal (1990) are available on the World Wide Web from the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
at the address <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu>.
Rousseau R EVIEWin each year from 1641 to 1794; the amounts of
gold, silver, and coins that left with these voyages;
and the market values of their incoming cargoes.4
If investment and trading activity in the VOC reflect
commercial activity in Amsterdam more broadly,
testing for statistical links between drawing balances
at the BA and VOC investment might shed some
light on how finance affected real activity at the
time. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the florin-
denominated real quantities as three-year moving
averages.5 Even casual examination of Figure 1
indicates that the market value of VOC trade, hard
money exports by the VOC, and the size of drawing
account balances at the BA all saw dramatic increases
following the financial crisis of 1672 until the mid-
1720s—increases that were sustained until the
decline of the VOC after 1780.
The vector autoregressive (VAR) approach facili-
tates investigation of dynamic interactions in station-
ary multivariate systems without imposing a priori
structural restrictions. This type of exploration seems
most appropriate for historical studies of finance
and growth, given the limitations of the available
data. For example, to investigate the relationship
between, say, the market value of VOC trade, drawing
balances at the BA, and the value of money ship-
ments to the East, a VAR would include a separate
regression for each variable in the system on its own
lags and those of the other variables:
(1a,b,c)
where x1 is trade, x2 is drawing balances, x3 is money
shipments, and k is the number of lags.
Stationarity of a VAR is important in interpreting
tests for Granger noncausality, that is, the hypothesis
that past values of a variable do not jointly improve
xa a X b X c X u
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one-step-ahead forecasts of another. Specifically, the
null hypothesis implies the following joint restric-
tions on the coefficients in (1):
(2)     lˆ
j,i=lˆ
j,i+1=…=lˆ
j,k=0 l=a,b,c;  j=1,2,3.
In general, the distributions of these tests are non-
standard when a VAR contains variables with unit
roots, and differencing is usually required to ensure
stationarity. Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) show,
however, that Granger tests conform to standard
distributions in trivariate VARs with unit roots, so
long as a cointegrating relationship exists among
the variables. I apply this result in the eight trivariate
systems for Amsterdam because the null hypothesis
of a unit root is not rejected with standard tests for
any of the variables and there appears to be a co-
integrating relationship in each system.6 Running a
VAR in levels is advantageous because it allows joint
evaluation of short- and long-term effects of move-
ments in one variable upon others in the system.
Granger-causality tests must be interpreted
cautiously since rejection of the block exclusion
restrictions does not necessarily imply that there is
“economic causality.” This is because the validity
of the test is predicated on the inclusion of the full
information set in the VAR. Since this condition is
violated in any finite regression framework, espe-
cially when the data at hand are only proxies for the
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4 The number of outgoing VOC voyages is from the Netherlands
Historical Data Archive’s (NHDA) data set D0100 titled “Dutch-Asiatic
shipping, 1602-1795.” The data are similar but not identical to those
presented in Bruijn, Gaastra, and Schoffer (1987). Eastbound money
shipments are from NHDA data set F3503 titled “Total amounts of
money, 1603-1795.” The market value of VOC trade is from NHDA
data set F3505 titled “Returning ships and products, 1641-1796.”
5 The long-run movement of VOC voyages tracks VOC trade closely
with a correlation coefficient of 0.69. The price index used to deflate
all florin-denominated quantitites is van Zanden’s (2000) consumption
price index for the western Netherlands.
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Figure 1
6 See the appendix for details and results of tests of unit roots and
cointegration.desired theoretical constructs, the results presented
below are suggestive of the nature of linkages
between finance and investment in pre-industrial
Amsterdam but cannot be taken as conclusive. 
When an investigator can specify a reasonable
causal ordering for the variables in a VAR system
(based on economic theory and perhaps the results
of Granger tests), the nonlinear responses of each
variable to one-time shocks in the others can be
traced through time. This facilitates an evaluation of
the economic importance (i.e., size) of the estimated
effects, and for this reason I augment the results of
Granger-causality tests with an examination of
selected impulse responses. 
Finance and VOC Investment
Table 1 presents estimates from four VARs that
cover the period from 1641 to 1794. The starting
year is that in which all data become continuously
available, and the end date was chosen to capture
the decline of the United Provinces but not the period
of political upheaval that surrounded the French
invasion of 1795. Nested likelihood ratio tests select
three lags.7 For each system, I report the sum of
the regression coefficients on the variable blocks
listed in the column headings in equations (1a)
through (1c) along with the significance level of the
F-test for block exclusion. In the upper left panel,
for example, the results for equation (1a) indicate
that the log of real drawing balances at the BA
Granger-cause the real market value of VOC trade
at the 1 percent level, while real money exports
Granger-cause trade at the 6 percent level. The
coefficients on the lag variables sum to a positive
number for each of these blocks. Equation (1b)
shows that neither VOC trade nor money exports
Granger-cause BA drawing balances, while equation
(1c) shows that BA balances Granger-cause money
exports.
The results are qualitatively similar in the upper-
right panel of Table 1, where the log of outgoing
VOC voyages replaces VOC trade as the measure of
84 JULY/AUGUST 2003
7 This method starts with a sufficiently large lag length and then tests
successively that the coefficients on the final lag are zero, stopping
when the restrictions are rejected.
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VAR Models of Financial Quantities and VOC Activity for Amsterdam, 1641-1794
Market BA  VOC  No.  of BA  VOC 
Dependent value  drawing  money  Adjusted  Dependent VOC  drawing  money  Adjusted 
Equation variable VOC trade balances exports R
2 variable voyages balances exports R
2
1a Market  value  0.402 0.204 0.134  0.663 No.  of  VOC  0.405 0.245 0.011  0.340
VOC trade (0.000) (0.007) (0.061) voyages (0.003) (0.082) (0.228)
1b BA drawing 0.041 0.799 0.061 0.806 BA drawing  0.097 0.778 0.062 0.809
balances (0.662) (0.000) (0.373) balances (0.268) (0.000) (0.303)
1c VOC money –0.032 0.318 0.795 0.693 VOC money 0.438 0.163 0.733 0.701
exports (0.551) (0.010) (0.000) exports (0.119) (0.043) (0.000)
Market BA  VOC  No.  of BA  VOC 
Dependent value  drawing  debt  Adjusted  Dependent VOC  drawing  debt  Adjusted 
Equation variable VOC trade balances at BA R
2 variable voyages balances at BA R
2
1a Market value 0.691 0.195 –0.054 0.718 No. of VOC 0.420 0.397 0.046 0.315
VOC trade (0.000) (0.000) (0.463) voyages  (0.008) (0.021) (0.466)
1b BA drawing 0.218 0.729 0.185 0.791 BA drawing  0.132 0.791 0.019 0.794
balances (0.094) (0.000) (0.046) balances (0.037) (0.000) (0.271)
1c VOC debt –0.031 0.059 0.840 0.868 VOC debt  –0.006 0.040 0.866 0.873
at BA (0.141) (0.056) (0.000) at BA (0.012) (0.118) (0.000)
NOTE: Equation numbers correspond to those in the text. Each VAR uses three lags. The VARs in the upper panel are in real log levels;
in the lower panel they are in real levels due to zero values for VOC debt in some years. The table reports the sum of the regression
coefficients for each variable block, with the significance level of the F-test for Granger noncausality in parentheses beneath the
coeffcient sums.
Table 1investment, though money exports are no longer
statistically significant in equation (1a). These find-
ings suggest that increases in the size of the BA’s
drawing account balances did indeed have a positive
effect on commercial activity. Further, larger bal-
ances increased the amount of hard money that
was used in conducting VOC business. This seems
reasonable, as more resources at the disposal of the
Bank would make it easier to meet demands for
bullion prior to ship departures. There is no evidence
of feedback from either VOC trade or the number
of voyages to drawing account balances or money
exports. Thus, the effects of the financial variables
appear to be unidirectional.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses. The
Granger-causality tests in Table 1 imply that placing
drawing account balances first, money exports
second, and either VOC voyages or trade third would
move from the most statistically “exogenous” to the
least. In panels A and B of Figure 2, a 1 percent
change in BA balances is related to an increase in
VOC trade of about 0.45 percent after two years and
a sharp increase in VOC voyages of about 0.3 percent.
Both effects decay slowly. Evaluated at the sample
means, the responses imply that increasing BA
balances by 1.6 million florins (10 percent) would
increase VOC trade by 2.8 million florins and lead
to 3.7 additional voyages over the next five years.
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Selected Impulse Responses from VARs for Amsterdam, 1641-1794
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lines are one-standard-error bands. 
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Figure 2These increases would have been substantial given
that drawing balances at the BA were used to support
all types of commercial activity in the city, not just
that of the VOC. Panel C shows that a 1 percent
change in the amount of gold, silver, and coin sent
East by the VOC led to return cargoes that were
about 0.26 percent larger. Evaluated at the sample
means, this implies that for every florin in precious
metals sent out, incoming cargoes over the next five
years were worth 3.7 florins more. The VOC seems
to have deployed its metallic resources efficiently
in the East Indies. In panel D, a 1 percent change in
BA balances is associated with a 3.4 percent increase
in VOC money exports over a 5-year period. 
In the lower panels of Table 1, I switch to a
specification in real levels (i.e., without taking logs)
to allow the outstanding debt of the VOC at the BA,
which contains zero values in several years, to enter
the systems in place of money exports. I did this as
an initial test of whether the VOC faced financing
constraints in its operations. Interestingly, VOC debt
does not Granger-cause the number of voyages in
either system, though it does respond negatively to
increased trade and voyages. This might mean that,
when the company needed to get voyages underway
the BA did not stand in the way of providing working
capital and that, once equipped, the VOC’s demand
for debt fell off. This is not the type of behavior
that one would expect from a company that was
having trouble raising cash in the local financial
market.
Finance and the Q-Theory of Investment
The Q-theory of investment as first described
by Brainard and Tobin (1968) predicts that a firm’s
investment rate will rise with its Q (the ratio of
market value to the replacement cost of capital).
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen’s (1998, FHP) study
of financing behavior among U.S. firms in the 1980s,
however, casts doubt on a single-factor Q-theory in
favor of one in which access to the capital market
figures prominently. Indeed, FHP’s firm-level regres-
sions show that cash flow explains investment more
effectively than a host of alternatives and that Q
loses some of its explanatory power when cash is
included in the model. This is especially true for
firms with low dividend payout ratios, where in
some specifications Q loses statistical significance
altogether. This effect probably occurs because
86 JULY/AUGUST 2003
Rousseau R EVIEW
VAR Models of Q and Investment for the Dutch East India Company, 1723-94
Market BA  No.  of BA 
Dependent  value  drawing Adjusted  Dependent  VOC  drawing Adjusted 
Equation variable VOC trade balances VOC Q R
2 variable voyages balances VOC Q R
2
1a Market value  0.399  –0.211 0.062  0.467 No. of VOC  0.111  –0.103  0.050  0.032
VOC trade (0.001) (0.178) (0.004) voyages (0.786) (0.812) (0.098)
1b BA drawing –0.088 0.413 0.029 0.296 BA drawing  0.054 0.477 0.015 0.323
balances (0.826) (0.000) (0.438) balances (0.642) (0.000) (0.549)
1c VOC Q –0.004 –0.285 0.972 0.892 VOC Q 0.114 –0.080 0.964 0.897
(0.590) (0.661) (0.000) (0.638) (0.583) (0.000)
Market VOC No.  of VOC
Dependent value debt Adjusted  Dependent VOC debt Adjusted 
Equation variable VOC trade at BA VOC Q R
2 variable voyages at BA VOC Q R
2
1a Market value 0.303 –0.399 0.748 0.550 No. of VOC 0.060 0.343 1.680 0.055
VOC trade (0.013) (0.126) (0.000) voyages  (0.942) (0.532) (0.055)
1b VOC debt –0.103 0.782 0.097 0.827 VOC debt  0.015 0.866 –0.045 0.829
at BA (0.135) (0.000) (0.760) at BA  (0.027) (0.000) (0.884)
1c VOC Q –0.021 –0.032 0.973 0.891 VOC Q 0.009 –0.021 0.938 0.899
(0.517) (0.709) (0.000) (0.335) (0.335) (0.000)
NOTE: See note for Table 1.
Table 2firms with low payout ratios are often small firms
that have limited access to external capital, which
makes financing constraints bind more sharply
when borrowing channels dry up. Since the VOC was
a large company, one would not expect it to face
financing constraints in today’s relatively efficient
U.S. capital market, but it certainly might face them
in a less developed market due to the effects of the
business cycle on the availability of loanable funds.
The VARs reported in Table 2 examine whether
such constraints were active between 1723 and 1794,
which is the period when continuous annual prices
of VOC shares become available (see footnote 3).
Like their counterparts in Table 1, these systems
include either the market value of VOC trade or the
number of outgoing voyages as measures of invest-
ment; but now they also include the VOC’s Q at the
end of each year.8 By then adding either drawing
account balances or VOC debt at the BA, I can exam-
ine whether Q is indeed the only determinant of
investment, as the theory would suggest, or whether,
as in FHP, the other financing variables come in
strongly and lower the estimated coefficients on Q.
The results in Table 2 are striking in that Q matters
for explaining VOC investment (equation (1a)) in all
four VARs, while neither drawing balances nor VOC
debt are significant determinants. Taken alongside
Table 1, this suggests that VOC investment did not
only grow with the capital market, but that tempo-
rary fluctuations in credit conditions within the BA
did not alter capital budgeting decisions being made
by the company directors. Rather, the Amsterdam
capital market was liquid enough for the VOC to
secure the funds needed for investment based on
its shadow price and did not rely on the official
bank of exchange. This seems to reflect financial
development in a most fundamental sense.
ENGLAND
Finance, Trade, and the Industrial
Revolution
England’s “financial revolution” can be traced
to Dutch innovation that accompanied William III
as he crossed the North Sea to accept the British
throne in 1688, but the event really involved two
phases—the first being pre-industrial and the second
being industrial. It is fortunate that the financial
institutions that arose to facilitate both internal and
external trade and to stabilize the monetary system
in the half century after the Glorious Revolution
left the nation poised to overcome the political
and social obstacles of financing their Industrial
Revolution. 
British finance got a strong start with the found-
ing of the Bank of England (BE) in 1694. Over its
first 50 years, the BE would become, to quote R.D.
Richards (1934, p. 272), “a credit institution, an organ
of State Finance, a discount and issuing house, a
bullion warehouse, and a safe repository.” Shortly
after its founding, the government had the nation’s
metallic currency recoined and the BE engaged in
various note-issuing experiments, both of which
promoted monetization of the economy and brought
some order to a disheveled monetary system. And
while the BE’s integral relationship with the state
has received the most attention among its scholars,
the BE’s support of London’s merchant and trading
communities through its clearing and discounting
facilities was too large to be overlooked (see Clapham,
1941). Indeed, it is the monetization and the private
business roles of the BE that I will focus upon in
this section. 
Before 1750, the BE coexisted only with a group
of private bankers in London who dealt primarily
in deposits and bills of exchange. This gave rise to
an active money market to finance trade and work-
ing capital for the fledgling manufacturing sector,
and the BE played a key role in its smooth operation.
A stock exchange emerged by the 1690s to facilitate
transactions in public debt securities and shares of
the large trading companies, including the British
East and West India Companies, the South Sea
Company, and the Royal African Company. In short,
England quickly achieved what Richard Sylla and I
have listed as four of the five elements of a “good”
financial system: (i) sound public finance, (ii) stable
money, (iii) a central bank, and (iv) well-functioning
securities markets (Rousseau and Sylla, 2001, pp.
2-3). 
With a reasonably “good” system in place by
1750, it remained for the financial sector to develop
the final feature: (v) a variety of banks. Indeed,
country banks did not spring up until the second
half of the 18th century, but made up for lost time
by multiplying rapidly, issuing their own notes to
facilitate transactions outside of London and foster-
ing correspondent relationships with London’s pri-
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8 The VOC did not change its share capital over the 71-year period that
I consider, so the Q of VOC equity is the ratio of price to par value of
the shares.vate bankers.9 Savings banks started up after 1817
to provide a vehicle for the surpluses of less-wealthy
individuals, but were never large enough to be a
very important part of the financial landscape. Major
legislation enacted in 1826 ended the BE’s long-
standing monopoly in the joint-stock banking busi-
ness, and though institutions (perhaps surprisingly)
did not form immediately in response, by 1840 there
were more than 600 joint-stock banks.
Amidst such important financial advances,
England was also undergoing a commercial and
industrial revolution. Figure 3 shows that the real
value of international trade, defined as the sum of
imports, domestic exports, and re-exports, rose by
50 percent between 1720 and 1760, and another
50 percent between 1760 and 1805.10 When viewed
alongside earlier data for the English East India
Company that indicates a more-than-sixfold increase
in Asian exports between 1660 and 1710, the rapid
commercialization of the British economy comes
into clear focus. Hoffman’s index of industrial pro-
duction (Mitchell, 1988, Table 8.21.A, pp. 431-32,
including building), also shown in Figure 3, pro-
gresses less rapidly than the trade series at first,
but accelerates after 1780 and once again around
1818; thus, it seems to share the rhythm of the later
part of the trade boom. 
Figure 3 also shows the “best guess” index of
industrial production from Crafts, Leybourne, and
Mills (1989, p. 58). This index corrects some of the
sectoral weightings in Hoffman’s index to reflect
more accurately the composition of the British econ-
omy in the latter part of the 18th century. The more
variable series does not show the rapid acceleration
in industrial production after 1780 that appears in
the Hoffman index and suggests that the Industrial
Revolution did not get into full swing until the early
part of the 19th century. This new information has
generated debate among economic historians as to
the timing of the Industrial Revolution, which is to
some extent beyond the scope of this paper. Since
all of the available macroeconomic time series, how-
ever, seem consistent with the initial development
of a commercial sector that later nurtured and was
complemented by a growing manufacturing sector
by the end of the 18th century, I examine economet-
ric models using both indices but focus on results
obtained with the more recent Crafts, Leybourne,
and Mills index.
Finance as a Leading Sector
Did England’s financial system promote the
coevolution of trade and industry? To address this
question quantitatively and in a macroeconomic
sense, it is necessary to construct a measure of
monetization. This is easier for the period before
1775 because London’s private bankers had stopped
issuing notes, which had always been a small part
of their business, years earlier due to competition
from the BE (Cameron, 1967, p. 22). It is thus fair to
say that coin and BE notes made up the circulating
medium used in London before 1750 and a large
part of what circulated outside of the city as well.
This is useful because time series for the circulation
and deposit liabilities of the BE are available almost
from its inception. The rise of deposit banking in
the countryside after 1775 and a lack of reliable
information about net specie imports, however,
doom any attempt to build a continuous series for
an M2 aggregate. Nevertheless, Figure 4 shows a
strong long-term relationship between the BE’s
deposit and circulation liabilities and Cameron’s
(1967, p. 42) sporadic estimates of the broad money
supply.11 Further, Huffman and Lothian’s (1980)
estimates of high-powered money for the 1833-50
period (not shown) track BE liabilities closely from
1840 to 1850, which is the period when the issues
of the joint-stock banks make the trend of the BE
series first begin to diverge from the pattern in
Cameron’s estimates. These observations offer rea-
son to believe that the BE’s deposit and circulation
88 JULY/AUGUST 2003
11 The circulation and deposit liabilities of the BE are from Mitchell
(1988, Table 12.2.A, pp. 655-58). I reconstructed a series for the Bank’s
private advances as the income from discounting bills and notes and
making private loans (Clapham, 1945, Vol. I, Appendix E, pp. 301-02,
and Vol. II, Appendix C, p. 433) divided by the Bank rate over the
previous year (Clapham, 1945, Vol. I, Appendix D, p. 299, discount
rates for inland bills, and Vol. II, Appendix B, pp. 429). This assumes
that the BE’s loans were primarily short term, which is consistent
with Clapham’s reading of the loan records.
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9 Relatively little is known about the extent of country banking in 18th
century England and its contribution to the money supply beyond the
information contained in Pressnell (1956). We do know, however, that
country banks were generally small and grew rapidly in number after
1750. Cameron (1967, pp. 23-24), for example, reports that “about a
dozen” existed in 1750, more than 100 in the early 1780s, more than
300 by 1800, and 783 in 1810.
10 The trade data are from Mitchell (1988), Table 10.1.A, pp. 448-49, for
England and Wales, 1720-91; Table 10.1.B, p. 450, for Great Britain,
1792-1804; and Table 10.2, pp. 451-52, for the U.K., 1805-50. I start
with the earlier and more narrow trade figures for England and Wales
and then successively join the broader aggregates to form a single
trade series. I form the price deflator using Mitchell (1988) by joining
the Schumpeter-Gilboy index for consumer goods for 1720-1819
(Table 14.1.B, pp. 719-20) with Rousseaux’s overall index for 1820-45
(Table 14.3, pp. 722) and the Sauerbeck-Statist index for 1847-50
(Table 14.4, p. 725).liabilities are useful as a proxy for long-term fluctua-
tions in narrowly defined money, and perhaps even
as a more general measure of monetization.
Part of the BE’s business was in making advances
to merchants with drawing accounts, though not
all those with accounts were entitled to discount
(Clapham, 1941). The BE also made over 90 loans
to the East India Company between 1709 and 1744,
but these direct loans, though exceeding bill and
note discounts in the BE’s early days, did not become
an important component of the asset portfolio until
the 1750s (see Figure 4). The BE’s private operations
grew rapidly after that and even approached the
size of its deposit and circulation liabilities during
the 1760s and again around 1800. Evidence from
the Bank archives shows that loans and discounts
were spread across a wide range of commercial
activities and that discounts below the statutory limit
of £50 were not unusual. Since advances were also
used to facilitate trade, fluctuations in their availabil-
ity may have also affected the course of trade. This
is among the possibilities that I examine below.
Quantitative Results with the Aggregate
Data
The empirical analysis proceeds as in Section 1,
but the two VARs that I consider first capture econ-
omic activity in a more general sense than was
possible for the Dutch Republic. The first system
explores dynamic interactions between industrial
production, trade, and monetization as measured
by the BE’s deposit and circulation liabilities. In the
second, I replace the measure of monetization with
the quantity of private loans and discounts at the
BE, which should reflect the stringency of credit
conditions in the London money market.
Table 3 reports the findings.12 Given the limita-
tions of early British data, it is striking  that BE liabili-
ties do indeed Granger-cause industrial production
at the 15 percent level in the upper panel and that
this effect is unidirectional. If BE liabilities reflect
monetization as I have suggested, this means that
finance moved before output in England’s modern
sector and may have played a leading role in its
development. Interestingly, neither monetization
nor industrial production appear to affect trade
quantities. In the lower panel of the table, BE private
lending does not Granger-cause industrial production
or trade, but trade does Granger-cause BE lending.
Since periods of high demand for trade credit are
likely to coincide with surges in real trading activity,
this relationship would be expected.13
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cannot be rejected for any of the variables considered in this section
using ADF tests with three lags, and Johansen tests indicate that the
systems are cointegrated. See appendix for details.
13 I also estimated the VARs using Hoffman’s index of industrial produc-
tion in place of the Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills index. The results for
the analogue of the upper panel in Table 3 were similar, though BE
liabilities in this case Granger-caused industrial production at the 10
percent level. This stronger result might be expected given the rise in
BE liabilities after 1770 and the (earlier) 1780 start of the Industrial
Revolution that Hoffman’s data imply. BE private loans also Granger-
cause trade at the 15 percent level when using Hoffman’s index.
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Figure 4Figure 5 displays selected impulse responses.
In the upper-left panel, a 1 percent increase in
“monetization” is associated with persistent increases
in industrial production that cumulate to nearly 2
percent after five years. In the upper-right panel, a
1 percent increase in industrial production increases
trade by about 0.42 percent over the same period.
The response of trade to a 1 percent rise in BE loans,
though not significant in the Granger tests, is “signifi-
cantly” positive (i.e., the lower one-standard-error
band rises above the zero line) three years after the
shock but cumulates to only 0.11 percent after five
years. Interestingly, the effect of a 1 percent increase
in monetization on trade, though also not statistically
significant in the Granger tests, adds up to nearly 1
percent after five years. Thus, the impulse responses
offer a richer interpretation than that obtained with
standard block exogeneity tests. Indeed, a pattern
emerges in which finance affects output, and to a
lesser extent trade, while increases in output encour-
age more trade.
Financing Constraints and the English
East India Company
The British version of the Asiatic trade behemoth,
the English East India Company (EIC), formed at
about the same time as its Dutch counterpart (1601),
but remained a loosely knit group of merchants
operating in the shadow of its North Sea rival for
decades before creating a permanent capital of
£369,891 in 1657 (Chaudhuri, 1978, p. 7). The
Company’s early operations were limited by an
inability to garner recently mined American silver
in quantities that the Dutch VOC could command.
The presence of more developed financial and trad-
ing institutions in Amsterdam to handle specie flows
is a likely explanation for the early preeminence of
the Dutch, but the English company managed to
expand operations early in the 18th century follow-
ing a merger in 1708 with a competing English trad-
ing company.
The EIC’s capital was small compared with the
turnover of its operations, and as such it depended
heavily on short-term debt and internally generated
funds to get voyages out to sea. If financing were a
problem for the Company in the 17th century, as
much anecdotal evidence suggests that it was, yet
became a less binding constraint as the English
financial system developed, we should observe the
availability of cash or debt financing as a less impor-
tant determinant of the Company’s investment
activities than something more fundamental such
as the quality of investment opportunities, at least
for the first half of the 18th century. Because the
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VARs of Financial and Real Activity for England, 1728-1850
Dependent Industrial  Market  value 
Equation variable production index trade BE liabilities Adjusted R
2
1a Industrial 0.980 –0.025 0.102 0.976
production index (0.000) (0.111) (0.136)
1b Market value trade 0.054 0.924 0.041 0.938
(0.335) (0.000) (0.346)
1c BE liabilities –0.010 0.125 0.888 0.921
(0.995) (0.091) (0.000)
Dependent Industrial  Market  value  BE
Equation variable production index trade private loans Adjusted R
2
1a Industrial 0.988 0.066 –0.009 0.976
production index (0.000) (0.039) (0.280)
1b Market value trade 0.075 0.918 0.009 0.938
(0.204) (0.000) (0.389)
1c BE private loans –0.152 0.386 0.877 0.886
(0.346) (0.005) (0.000)
NOTE: See note for Table 1. The VARs use four lags that were selected with nested likelihood ratio tests. Data are in real log levels.
Table 3available data cover the heyday of the EIC, the Q-
theory analysis that follows is even more telling for
the efficiency of English finance than that presented
in the previous section for the VOC, which covered
the period of gradual decline for the Dutch enterprise.
By 1710 a number of government securities
traded on the London Stock Exchange beside shares
of the main trading companies, and Castaing’s Course
of the Exchange (the Wall Street Journal of its day)
carried the share prices. Due to the painstaking work
of Larry Neal (1990, pp. 231-57), we now have a
nearly complete picture of EIC share prices from
this point onward. Balance sheet data, including
cash balances, debt levels, and trading values are
available for 1710-45 from Chaudhuri (1978).14 The
econometric specifications that I consider are simi-
lar to those estimated for the VOC (see Table 2), where
Q controls for the quality of the EIC’s investment
opportunities as perceived by the stock market,
exports proxy for actual investment, and the firm’s
cash balances and total debt alternately enter the
model to capture the dependence of the Company’s
investment on the availability of cash resources. 
The results, displayed in Table 4, offer evidence
that financing constraints did not bind for the EIC
over this period. In the upper panel, Q Granger-
causes EIC trade at the 5 percent level, while the
firm’s total debt levels do not approach statistical
significance. The effects are also unidirectional in a
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p. 440.
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A. Effect of BE Liabilities on Industrial Production

























C. Effect of BE Private Loans on Trade
NOTE: The impulse responses are taken from the VAR systems reported in Table 3. The ordering places BE deposit and
circulation liabilities or BE private loans first, the real market value of trade second, and real industrial producion third.
Using Monte Carlo integration, the solid lines are the mean impulse responses that result from 10,000 random draws 
from the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR coefficients. The dotted lines are one-standard-error bands. 
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Figure 5statistical sense, as evidenced by a lack of Granger-
causality from either EIC exports or debt to Q. The
results are similar in the lower panel when the EIC’s
cash balances replace external debt as the financial
variable. These results suggest that the EIC may have
been constrained by the quality of its investment
opportunities, but that the availability of finance
did not enter into investment decisions. This is, as
in the Dutch case, characteristic of a capital market
that could mobilize the resources needed for econ-
omic development. And though the VAR systems
are silent on whether such unconstrained access
to capital was available for smaller merchants and
manufacturers, “good” institutional arrangements
seem to have been in place for firms that had
achieved some degree of public reputation.
THE UNITED STATES
A “Federalist Financial Revolution”?
Any skeptic of the importance of finance in
promoting economic development must come to
grips with the powerful case of the United States
after adoption of the federal Constitution in 1788.
At no other point in history did the five elements of
a “good” financial system develop so rapidly. Much
of the credit for what Richard Sylla (1998) has
termed the “Federalist financial revolution” seems
appropriate to bestow upon the nation’s first secre-
tary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, though
the impact of Hamilton’s reforms on the real side
of the economy were perhaps not fully felt for
another quarter century, when the “modern” sector
finally emerged.
By any standards, the U.S. economy experienced
a near-miraculous turnaround in the last decade of
the 18th century, when it made the transition from
a defaulting debtor awash in obligations left over
from the war of independence to a magnet for inter-
national capital flows. The chartering of a national
bank, the First Bank of the United States, and
Hamilton’s ingenious idea of allowing federal debt
securities to be tendered for shares therein, quickly
raised the restructured U.S. debt, which had been
trading at pennies on the dollar through informal
channels, to par and above by 1791. Securities mar-
kets in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston quickly
sprang up to trade these securities and others associ-
ated directly with internal improvements.
Hamilton also established a federal mint, bring-
ing order to the collection of foreign coins and
various issues of fiat paper that had previously
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VAR Models of Q and Trade for the British East India Company, 1710-45
Dependent Market  value EIC
Equation variable EIC trade total debt EIC Q Adjusted R
2
1a Market value  0.979 –0.804 0.382 0.591
EIC trade (0.090) (0.386) (0.042)
1b EIC total debt 0.423 0.077 –0.089 0.770
(0.004) (0.636) (0.131)
1c EIC Q  –0.069 0.117 0.449 0.653
(0.149) (0.254) (0.000)
Dependent Market  value EIC
Equation variable EIC trade cash balance EIC Q Adjusted R
2
1a Market value  0.344 –0.241 0.399 0.550
EIC trade (0.388) (0.783) (0.073)
1b EIC cash balance –0.590 –0.335 0.057 0.012
(0.198) (0.441) (0.965)
1c EIC Q  –0.513 –0.491 0.567 0.891
(0.151) (0.191) (0.000) 
NOTE: See note for Table 1. The VARs use three lags. EIC trade and debt are in real log levels in the upper panel. Due to negative
observations for cash, EIC trade and cash balances enter the VAR in the lower panel as real levels.
Table 4comprised the nation’s money stock under a bi-
metallic standard. Over the next 50 years, the number
of banks would rise from 3 in 1791 to more than
800, and the paid-in capital of the banking system
would increase by more than 100-fold!
Given the speed with which a sophisticated
financial sector emerged in the United States, it is
surprising that economic historians have only
recently begun to consider seriously its implications
for the nation’s early growth. This is probably
because agriculture remained dominant for most
of the 19th century, preventing measures of early
gross national product (GNP), such as those of David
(1967) or Berry (1988), from reflecting growth in
the “modern” sector very well—that is, the part of
the economy that would have relied most on the
types of financing arrangements that were available
in the U.S. markets of the time. 
Measures of Financial and Real Sector
Development
As in the analyses of the Dutch Republic and
England noted previously, it is the development of
a “modern” sector, as measured by foreign trade
and investment activity, that I will focus upon in
the empirical analysis.15 Figure 6 presents the series.
Both foreign trade and private domestic investment
rise slowly in real terms until 1815, when they begin
to accelerate, which is consistent with the rise of a
modern sector at about this time. 
On the financial side, a measure of monetization
is again needed. And though it is difficult to measure
the quantity of specie in the hands of the public—
the most important component of the money stock
in the early national period—with any degree of
confidence, Rousseau and Sylla (1999) use the avail-
able data to extend Peter Temin’s (1969) series, which
begins in 1820, back to 1790 by replicating Temin’s
method as closely as possible.16 The resulting series
includes obligations of banks to the public and specie
outside of banks, and thus represent assets that are
either acceptable or quickly convertible for use in
market transactions. Increases in the real value of
these assets reflect more widespread use of the
market economy and might be plausibly linked to
trade and investment.
It is also for the United States that I can first
introduce securities markets explicitly into the
empirics. Rousseau and Sylla (1999, pp. 7-12), in
tandem with Sylla, Wilson, and Wright (1997), col-
lected the total number of securities listed in the
financial press for three major cities (New York,
Philadelphia, and Boston) around the end of each
calendar year from 1790 to 1850, and I will use this
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16 The data and methods used to construct the annual series for the U.S.
money stock are described in detail in Appendix A of Rousseau and
Sylla (1999, pp. 48-50), and the series will appear in the forthcoming
millennial edition of the Historical Statistics of the United States.
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15 Foreign trade is the sum of total exports and imports (U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1975, Series U1
and U8, pp. 865-66). Gross domestic investment is from Berry (1988).as a robust measure of the size (and perhaps the
sophistication) of the securities market.
Figure 7 displays financial series. Both money and
securities listings grow slowly until about 1815 when
they begin to rise quickly. Overall, both series grow
at an average rate of about 4.5 percent per year, which
is higher than the 1.9 percent growth rate of GDP
(Berry 1988) and implies rapid financial deepening. 
Time-Series Findings
To explore possible links between the financial
and real variables described above, I start with a
VAR specification that includes measures of invest-
ment, trade, and monetization. I will then add the
number of listed securities to this system to measure
their additional impact. The method of bringing
securities markets into the analysis incrementally
is consistent with Levine and Zervos (1998) and
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), who keep a measure
of liquid liabilities in their baseline models to allow
for complementarities between banks and stock
markets in the growth process. All data are trans-
formed into logs before analysis. Table A1 in the
Appendix shows that the four series that I use are
statistically indistinguishable from unit root pro-
cesses, and Table A2 shows that the two systems
are cointegrated, which justifies running the VARs
in levels form. 
Table 5 presents the results. In the upper panel,
the findings for the three-variable system show that
the money stock Granger-causes both real invest-
ment (top line, third column) at the 2 percent level,
and the value of real trade (second line, second
column) at the 1 percent level. Trade Granger-causes
investment at the 10 percent level, but has a negative
overall effect, which suggests that increases in the
import component of trade may have to some degree
crowded out investment in the early United States.
In the lower panel, the results for the four-variable
system are similar to the three-variable results inso-
far as the monetary effects are concerned, yet the
size of the securities market also exerted a positive
and independent effect on investment. Listed securi-
ties do not Granger-cause trade, however, which
suggests that the rise of securities markets had their
largest effects in the domestic capital market. 
Figure 8 presents selected impulse responses
from the four-variable system in Table 5. In panels
A and B, respectively, 1 percent increases in the
94 JULY/AUGUST 2003
Rousseau R EVIEW
VARs of Financial and Real Activity for the United States, 1790-1850
Dependent Market  value
Equation variable Investment trade Money stock Adjusted R
2
1a Investment 0.717 –0.266 0.423 0.964
(0.000) (0.094) (0.018)
1b Market value –0.239 0.377 0.549 0.663
trade (0.799) (0.001) (0.010)
1c Money stock 0.154 0.037 0.840 0.973
(0.075) (0.958) (0.000)
Dependent  Market value No. of listed
Equation variable Investment trade Money stock securities Adjusted R
2
1a Investment 0.245 –0.253 0.281 0.470 0.972
(0.570) (0.025) (0.009) (0.005)
1b Market value –0.050 0.373 0.597 –0.185 0.664
trade (0.918) (0.001) (0.004) (0.391)
1c Money stock 0.089 0.032 0.823 0.074 0.971
(0.168) (0.961) (0.000) (0.669)
1d No. of listed –0.053 –0.013 –0.015 1.042 0.991
securities (0.772) (0.879) (0.662) (0.000)
NOTE: See note for Table 1. The VARs use four lags that were selected with nested likelihood ratio tests. Data are in real log levels.
The lower panel reports results from a four-dimensional system, which requires an extra equation (1d) in the VAR.
Table 5real stock of money are associated with increases
in trade of 2.78 percent and in investment of 1.35
percent after five years. Panels C and D indicate
that 1 percent increases in the number of listed secu-
rities increase trade by 2.70 percent and investment
by 1.37 percent after five years. The result for the
effect of listed securities on trade is striking because
the Granger tests did not show a significant effect,
which once again is an important reason to consider
the nonlinear and interactive impulse responses
when evaluating VAR systems. The effects of both
the money stock and the number of listed securities
on trade and investment are of about the same order
of magnitude once they have had an opportunity
to work their way through the VAR for five years. 
There is no doubt that the data available for the
United States in the early national period are sketchy,
yet they have been generated using the best practices
available to the economic historian. And the relative
strength of the results with these data reveal that
the nascent “finance-led growth” hypothesis for
the United States at the very least requires much
more investigation among macroeconomists and
economic historians alike.
JAPAN
Financial Developments in the Meiji
Period
In the decade that followed the restoration of
the Meiji regime in 1868, Japan made a quantum
JULY/AUGUST 2003      95
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Rousseau
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 13579 1 1 1 3 1 5









A. Effect of Money on Trade Value
Selected Impulse Responses from a Four-Variable VAR for the United States, 1728-1850
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NOTE: The impulse responses are taken from the VAR systems reported in the lower panel of Table 5. The variable
ordering places the number of listed securities first, the real money stock second, the real market value of trade third, 
and real investment last. Using Monte Carlo integration, the solid lines plot the mean impulse responses that result from

























Figure 8leap in the development of financial markets and
foreign trade and quickened the pace of its indus-
trialization. Scholars of the period such as Ott (1962)
and Lockwood (1968) have remarked that the finan-
cial sector was instrumental in promoting the adop-
tion of new agricultural and machine-based industrial
technologies that allowed Japan to achieve modern
rates of economic growth after 1885. This section
reviews the empirical evidence for this proposition
using available historical statistics and drawing from
the more extended analysis in Rousseau (1999).
Among the financial innovations of the 1870s,
the most important was the commutation of rice
payments (i.e., taxes) that were normally made to
the feudal nobility through an issue of long-term
government bonds, which were redeemable only
at heavy discounts. In an action reminiscent of
Alexander Hamilton, an 1876 revision of the National
Bank Act then allowed these bonds to be used as
banking capital. Like its U.S. predecessor, stock
markets emerged in Tokyo and Osaka shortly there-
after for trading the fresh securities. A rapid expan-
sion in the number of national banks from 5 in 1876
to 151 in 1879 ensued (Bank of Japan, 1966, p. 196).
Among the new banks was the Yokahoma Specie
Bank, which started up in 1880 to meet the foreign
exchange needs of merchants who were active in
the nation’s growing foreign trade and spurred by
the low tariff rates that remained in effect until 1895.
As the economy opened more and more to the
West, it was able to import industrial technologies,
such as the power loom that had been available in
Europe and the United States for decades, and was
able to do so at relatively low cost.
Japan’s financial development was briefly short-
circuited in 1880 when note issues of the newly
formed banks flooded the market and caused an
episode of sharp inflation, but this experience led
to a consolidation of note issuance under the nation’s
first central bank, which formed in 1882. In short,
by 1885 Japan had achieved all five elements of a
“good” financial system and did so almost as quickly
as the United States had 80 years earlier.
Evidence of Finance-Led Growth in
Meiji Japan 
The statistical analysis uses a broad measure of
financial development that encompasses the total
assets of Japan’s most important intermediaries and
the book values of corporate debt and equity in the
hands of the public. The intermediaries include
commercial banks (national, private, and ordinary),
special banks, savings banks, agricultural coopera-
tives, and insurance companies, but do not include
quasi-banks, small credit cooperatives, and country
pawnbrokers (who, according to Goldsmith, 1983,
p. 27, accounted for as much as 18 percent of all
intermediary assets).17 Figure 9 shows the remark-
able growth of the broad financial aggregate from
1880 to 1913 and contrasts it with the relative flat-
ness of the amount of currency in circulation. GNP
and private domestic fixed investment serve as mea-
sures of real sector performance.
The trivariate VAR specifications that I consider
include currency in circulation, the broad financial
aggregate, and either output or private fixed invest-
ment, with all variables converted to logs of real
1900 quantities prior to analysis. The unit root and
cointegration tests for these systems, reported in
Tables A1 and A2 of the appendix, suggest that esti-
mation in levels is appropriate. Table 6 presents the
results. In the upper panel, financial assets Granger-
cause GNP at the 1 percent level, currency Granger-
causes GNP at the 10 percent level, and there is no
feedback from GNP to either currency or financial
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from the Bank of Japan (1966), Ott (1962), and a five-volume series
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(1999, pp. 196-97) for details.
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Figure 9assets. The lower panel reports qualitatively similar
findings when private fixed investment replaces GNP
as the measure of real sector activity, except that
investment and financial assets now Granger-cause
currency. This result reflects a complementarity
between cash and real investment, which is consis-
tent with the developing-economy model introduced
by McKinnon (1973, esp. Chap. 6). There is again no
feedback from investment or currency to financial
assets.
The impulse responses in Figure 10 indicate
that the effects of real financial assets on real output
and investment are large, with a 1 percent increase
in financial assets associated with a 1.38 percent
increase in GNP (panel B) and a 1.37 percent increase
in investment after five years (panel D). It is the
effect of currency on investment (panel C) that is
truly striking, with a 1 percent increase in currency
raising investment by 7.6 percent after five years.
Though strong inferences should surely be avoided
given the sheer size of the response and the fact
that it was derived from a VAR system with only
34 usable time series observations, the result
nonetheless emphasizes that all economic actors
did not necessarily have access to the formal finan-
cial sector and may have used cash as a vehicle for
saving to overcome investment indivisibilities.
Overall, the findings for Meiji Japan suggest
that the financial system played a key role in promot-
ing output and investment and offer strong support
for the hypothesis of “finance-led” growth.
FROM 1850 TO THE PRESENT
The case approach taken in the previous sections
facilitated the statistical investigation of four of his-
tory’s “financial revolutions” and their impact on
real activity, but is indeed limited to countries that
achieved some degree of what might be called
economic “success.” This means that there are ele-
ments of selection bias in the cases considered
here, not the least of which involves the very avail-
ability of early economic data for countries where
financial institutions emerged in conjunction with
modernization.
This problem is present but less severe after
1850, however, because economic data become
available for an increasing number of countries.
From 1850 to 1929, for example, continuous mea-
sures of real output and monetization can be assem-
bled for a set of 17 countries that are often referred
to as the “Atlantic” economies, even though Australia
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VARs of Financial and Real Activity for Japan, 1880-1913
Dependent Currency  in Financial
Equation variable GNP circulation assets Adjusted R
2
1a GNP –0.163 0.097 0.360 0.988
(0.582) (0.088) (0.001)
1b Currency in  –0.287 0.800 0.075 0.833
circulation (0.576) (0.000) (0.286)
1c Financial assets –0.170 –0.041 0.999 0.994
(0.959) (0.875) (0.000)
Dependent Private Currency  in Financial
Equation variable investment circulation assets Adjusted R
2
1a Private Investment 0.236 1.895 0.457 0.957
(0.074) (0.055) (0.036)
1b Currency in  –0.138 1.060 0.087 0.872
circulation (0.010) (0.000) (0.014)
1d Financial  assets –0.080 0.143  1.007 0.993
(0.616) (0.585) (0.000)
NOTE: See note for Table 1. The VAR with GNP uses three lags of each variable, and the VAR with private investment uses four, with
the lag orders selected with nested likelihood ratio tests.
Table 6and Japan are usually included in the group.18 This
sample is broad enough to consider a cross-section
analysis of the relationship between financial deep-
ening and economic growth with the techniques
used so successfully for the post-World War II period
by Ross Levine and his collaborators (e.g., King and
Levine, 1993). In this section, I present a few cross-
sectional results for the Atlantic economies over the
1850-1997 period, and then compare the findings
with those obtained for the subperiod 1850-1930.19
The data are from four main sources. From 1960,
it is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database. Data for earlier years are from worksheets
underlying Bordo and Jonung (2001) and Obstfeld
and Taylor (2003), and Mitchell (1998a,b,c).20
To examine the partial correlations between the
size of the financial sector and economic growth
from 1850 while retaining the widest cross section
possible, it is necessary to choose a broad aggregate,
such as the ratio of the liquid liabilities to output,
as the measure of financial development. Liquid lia-
bilities is, of course, an imprecise measure because
of nonbank intermediaries such as insurance and
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18 The 17 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
19 The results draw primarily from Rousseau and Sylla (2001). Interested
readers should see this earlier paper for a more extended analysis.
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NOTE: The impulse responses are taken from the VARs reported in Table 6. The variable ordering places financial assets
first, currency second, and either GNP or private domestic investment third. Using Monte Carlo integration, the solid lines
plot the mean impulse responses that result from 10,000 random draws from the distribution of the estimated VAR 




20 Rousseau and Sylla (2001, pp. 39-45) include a complete description
of the data sources and methods used in constructing this panel.investment companies whose liabilities do not wind
up in the aggregate. These omissions are probably
not that important in the prewar period, but quite
substantial in recent years. Further, the broadly
defined money stock does not include securities
markets. Growth in real income per head, despite
its inability to reflect the distribution of wealth and
its implications for welfare, is a common measure
of economic performance and is readily available
for all 17 countries back into the mid-19th century.
Following the now-standard cross-country
growth specification of Barro (1991) as supplemented
by King and Levine (1993), Table 7 presents regres-
sions in which the average growth rate of real per
capita GDP is the dependent variable. Averaging is
done across decades for the 1850-1997 period and
across five-year periods for 1850-1929. The baseline
regression also conditions on the level of per capita
income (in 1960 U.S. dollars) at the start of each
period to capture a convergence or “catching up”
effect. The ratio of government expenditure to GDP
also appears because the resource requirements
that are often associated with large public expendi-
tures are likely to “crowd out” private investment
and lead to less efficient resource allocations than
the private sector might provide. Finally, the ratio
of the broad money stock to GDP is included to
capture the effects of financial development. The
specification also includes dummy variables for
each time period to control for time trends in the
levels variables and for business cycle effects. 
In the ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions,
the first observations for each period are used as
the regressors to ameliorate the impact of possible
reverse causality from growth to additional finance.
This technique cannot fully eliminate the simultane-
ity problem due to autocorrelation in the time series
for financial depth, but it does ensure that all regres-
sors are predetermined and thus plausible determi-
nants of subsequent growth. The instrumental
variables (IV) specifications use contemporaneous
averages of the data as regressors and control for
simultaneity by instrumenting in each period with
the initial values of the complete set of regressors,
initial inflation, and the ratio of initial trade (exports
plus imports) to GDP. 
A strong convergence effect, as indicated by
negative coefficients on initial income that are sta-
tistically significant at the 5 percent level, is common
to all four regressions reported in Table 7. Govern-
ment expenditure has the expected negative sign
and is significant at the 5 percent level for the full
1850-1997 period, but is not quite significant at
the 10 percent level for the pre-Depression period,
though the coefficients are about the same size
throughout. The coefficient sizes are robust to the
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Cross-country Growth Regressions, 1850-1997 and 1850-1929
Dependent variable: % growth of per capita real GDP
1850-1997 1850-1929
OLS IV OLS IV
Constant 7.463** 6.776** 6.206** 6.308**
(1.500) (1.477) (2.034) (2.050)
Log of initial real per capita GDP –0.706** –0.603** –0.710** –0.731**
(0.179) (0.179) (0.307) (0.305)
Initial ratio of broad money to GDP 0.949* 0.956* 2.251** 2.186**
(0.541) (0.540) (1.075) (1.039)
Initial ratio of government expenditure  –5.280** –5.915** –6.229 –6.397
to GDP (2.299) (2.583) (3.848) (4.150)
R
2 0.339 0.372 0.137 0.147
No. of observations 211 197 186 185
NOTE: The table reports coefficients from OLS and IV regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the
growth rate of real per capita GDP averaged for each decade for the regressions that cover 1850 to 1997 and averaged over 5-year periods
for the regressions that cover 1850 to 1929. Initial values are taken from the first year of each period. Period dummies are included in
the regression but are not reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
Table 7choice of the initial value OLS or IV estimation tech-
nique. It is the differences across subperiods in the
coefficients on the ratio of the broad money stock,
however, that are particularly interesting. For 1850-
1997, the coefficients are about 1 and significant at
only the 10 percent level. Evaluated at the sample
mean of 50.6 percent, this implies that an increase
in financial depth of 10 percentage points would
increase the annual growth rate of GDP by about
0.1 percent, which is not particularly large. For the
1850-1929 period, the coefficients are significant
at the 5 percent level and more than double the size,
implying an increase in GDP growth of 0.22 percent
per year for a 10-percentage-point increase in finan-
cial depth from the sample mean of 42.8 percent.
The sharper increase in output for a given
change in financial depth in the pre-1930 period is
consistent with the view that financial factors matter
most emphatically in the early stages of economic
development by mobilizing and allocating resources
and make smaller contributions to the efficiency of
resource allocation in more mature economies.
The sample of “Atlantic” economies makes this
point clear, since many were relatively “immature”
in the 19th century yet nearly all could be termed
“mature” today. King and Levine (1993) obtain results
using a similar specification for the post-1960 period
that are similar to mine for 1850-1929, and now
we can posit at least one reason for this: the King
and Levine sample, due to its inclusion of 80 or more
countries, captures many of them in their emerging
phases and is thus closer in composition, at least
insofar as phases of economic development are con-
cerned, to the earlier sample of Atlantic economies.
CONCLUSION
The case studies considered in this article offer
statistical evidence that the development of banking
and securities markets mattered for industrialization
and the expansion of commerce in four economies
that are generally considered to have experienced
“financial revolutions” over the past 400 years. The
data are more limited than those at the disposal of
the modern macroeconomist, and this means that
results must be interpreted as more suggestive than
definitive, yet the consistency of the evidence with
the historical narrative that can be obtained by let-
ting the data speak is unmistakable. Cross-country
evidence for the period from 1850 to the present
indicates that the results obtained in the case studies
are not just a result of biases imposed by the avail-
ability of historical data. 
Surely other factors, particularly the adoption
of new technologies, are also at the center of com-
mercial and industrial revolutions. In 17th century
Amsterdam, that innovation was the ability to build
seaworthy vessels quickly and cheaply enough to
exploit the trade opportunities associated with cir-
cumventing the Cape of Good Hope. For early 19th
century England, it was steam, the power loom, and
a host of other machines that raised productivity.
Even in these cases, however, the new technologies
needed financing to get off the ground, and the
emerging financial markets in these nations seem
to have provided it. And the very availability of
financing would have encouraged other potential
entrepreneurs to formulate new business ideas. 
It is in this way that I believe the financial sector
mobilized the resources needed to start large pro-
jects in the pre-industrial period and had incentive
effects in the real sector that extended beyond those
firms that actually received financing. It remained
for the later industrial phases, at least in England
and the United States, for the financial sector to
develop the sophisticated screening and monitor-
ing functions required to affect economic growth
through the quality of resource allocations, but the
expansion of deposit banking in these countries
ultimately did this as well. The process of market
emergence and expansion prepared each of the
four nations for world economic leadership over
the next century—positions that Amsterdam and
England were able to retain until new technologies,
both real and financial, displaced them in classic
episodes of Schumpeterian creative destruction.
Will today’s information technology revolution
hasten the emergence of a “world” financial market
in which the United States will assume the role of
partner among equals rather than the leadership
position to which we have grown accustomed over
the past century or so?
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Appendix
TIME-SERIES PROPERTIES OF DATA
USED IN THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This appendix presents Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots and Johansen (1991)
tests for cointegration in the series and VAR systems
used in the analysis. If ADF tests are unable to reject
the unit root for a series in levels, yet reject after
differencing, there is some justification for treating
the series as I(1) in subsequent modeling. The
univariate representations for the ADF tests include
four lags. The trending nature of the series make
both constant and trend terms necessary in the
levels tests, while a constant-only regression is used
for the first differences. The log transformation is
applied to series that enter VAR systems as such.
Table A1 reports the test statistics and significance
levels. 
A VAR system with nonstationary variables is
classified as cointegrated if a linear combination
exists that yields a stationary series when applied to
the data. In the trivariate case, a cointegrating
relationship also implies that the error terms of
the system are stationary. The technique developed
by Johansen (1991) provides a regression-based test
for determining both the presence of cointegration
and the number of linear stationary combinations
that span the space. Each system is modeled as a
VAR of the form
(A.1)
where xt is a vector containing the potentially
endogenous variables and k is adequately large
both to capture the short-run dynamics of the
underlying VAR and to generate residuals that
approximate the normal distribution. The lag
order for each system is chosen with a series of
nested likelihood ratio tests. The presence of trends
in the data suggests the inclusion of an unrestricted
intercept. The Johansen methodology tests whether
the Π Π matrix in (A.1) is of less than full rank via
the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics.
Table A2 includes the results and significance
levels for the four countries in the study.
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ADF Tests for Series Used in the Empirical Analysis
Levels 1st Difference
Amsterdam, 1641-1794
Market value of VOC trade –2.38 –8.60**
No. of outbound VOC voyages –3.46* –8.46**
VOC hard money exports –1.89 –6.48**
BA drawing balances –2.85 –6.36**
VOC debt at the BA –3.41 –5.29**
England, 1728-1850
Industrial production –0.10 –6.85**
Market value of trade –0.86 –5.94**
BE circulation and deposits –2.15 –6.09**
BE private loans –1.41 –5.35**
EIC exports (1710-45) –2.93 –3.19*
EIC debt (1710-45) –2.14 –2.48
EIC cash balances (1710-45) –2.52 –3.23**
EIC Q (1710-45) –3.10 –2.88
United States, 1790-1850
Domestic investment –2.50 –4.32**
Foreign trade –2.14 –4.39*
Money stock –2.38 –3.65*
No. of listed securities –1.58 –3.61*
Japan, 1880-1913
Gross national product –2.27 –6.39**
Private domestic investment –1.94 –5.42**
Currency in circulation –2.68 –4.67**
Financial assets –3.80** –3.68**
NOTE: * and ** denote rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Johansen Tests for Cointegration
Trace Maximum eigenvalue
r = 0 r ≤ 1r   ≤ 2r  =  0r  ≤ 1r   ≤ 2
Amsterdam (K = 3)
Trade, BA balances, money exports 49.19** 21.38** 3.22* 27.81** 18.16** 3.22*
Trade, BA balances, VOC debt 49.03** 11.68 2.64 37.35** 9.04 2.64
Voyages, BA balances, money exports 55.74** 27.05** 2.58 28.69** 24.20** 2.58
Voyages, BA balances, VOC debt 46.90** 21.12** 3.08* 25.78** 18.04** 3.08*
Trade, BA balances, VOC Q 38.22** 12.17 1.05 26.05** 11.12 1.05
Trade, VOC debt, VOC Q 33.63** 8.37 1.26 25.26** 7.11 1.26
Voyages, BA balances, VOC Q 35.53** 14.89* 0.94 18.63* 15.95** 0.94
Voyages, VOC debt, VOC Q 26.92* 8.64 1.27 16.29 7.36 1.27
England (K = 4)
Industrial prod., trade, BE liabilities 33.53** 14.05* 4.29* 19.48* 9.76 4.29*
Industrial prod., trade, BE loans 23.93 7.38 3.22 16.55 4.16 3.22
EIC trade, EIC debt, EIC Q (K = 3) 45.01** 19.37** 5.45** 25.63** 13.92* 5.45**
EIC trade, EIC cash, EIC Q (K = 3) 41.84** 20.19** 5.81** 21.65** 14.39** 5.81**
United States (K = 4)
Investment, trade, money 34.24** 6.05 0.25 28.19** 5.80 0.25
Investment, trade, money,  60.23** 20.93 8.76 39.30** 12.17 7.83
no. of listed securities r ≤ 3 0.93
Japan (K = 4)
GNP, currency, financial assets 37.77** 9.01 2.70 25.76 6.31 2.70
Investment, currency, financial assets 48.52** 9.45 2.70 39.07** 6.20 2.70
NOTE: K is the lag at which the levels terms enter the test regressions. The columns labeled r = 0 test a null hypothesis of no cointegration,
while the r ≤ 1 (r ≤ 2) columns test a null of at most one (two) cointegrating vector(s). * and ** denote rejections of the null at the 10
and 5 percent levels, respectively, with critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992, Table 1).
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